This paper will explore the evolution of SCADA systems and of critical infrastructures management under the perspective of the growing concerns with Information Assurance, Security and Reliability. It will report on the ongoing work at EDP Distribuição as one of the key topics of its Intelligent Power Delivery programme.
INTRODUCTION
Distribution service management and grid operation are nowadays supported by a complex architecture of actuators, sensors, communications and information systems, assuring extensive collection and management of real-time data, runtime decision-support and coordinated control. This constitutes the core of modern supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, as well as advanced metering infrastructures (AMI), which implement process oriented and integrated approaches both to grid and to client management, more efficient control paradigms, improve plant and staff safety, and reduce the cost of operation.
The use of standard hardware and software in SCADA systems combined with improved communication protocols and interconnectivity to outside networks, both corporate and the internet, allow to cope with increasing complexity of networks and service and provide high levels of efficiency and effectiveness in decision support to operation and operations planning. Furthermore, new business and market drivers promote the deployment of large numbers of AMI related intelligent devices down to the customers premises, with bi-directional wired or wireless communication and capabilities for data collection, data storage and concentration, data distribution as well as command execution.
Whilst these innovations benefit the operation of critical utility infrastructures, they also increase vulnerability to attacks and to erroneous actions from a variety of external and internal sources. Secure and dependable systems and networks are required, which can intelligently react to abnormal situations and ensure the quality of the relevant information.
CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURES
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) refers generically to computer and network systems which perform data collection and cyber control of physical processes, such as those of electrical utilities. These processes can span several sites spread out over large areas and as such, SCADA systems are today inherently distributed, although their aim is to allow supervision and control from one or a few centralized points, from/to where all information flows.
The SCADA system usually controls pipelines, water and transportation systems, utilities, refineries, chemical plans, and a wide variety of manufacturing operations because with these systems it is possible to implement efficient control, improve plant and personnel safety, and reduce the cost of operation.
SCADA systems started to be used as standalone systems without networks and completely isolated with no connectivity to other systems. In addition, systems were built based on custom hardware and software. At that time, control systems were confined to a particular plant and consisted of a central unit that communicated with local controllers that interfaced with motors, pumps, valves, switches, sensors, and so on. In order to perform the connections between devices, companies and vendors developed their own communication protocols, many of which were proprietary.
In order to improve both computer and networks effectiveness and reduce total cost of ownership, SCADA systems started to use standard hardware and software. Electrical utilities have also increased their reliance on the internet and communication networks and SCADA systems have evolved from standalone to distributed, exposed to the same vulnerabilities and threats that plague usual computer systems.
Business impact of cyber assets
Hardware computers, SCADA software and communication lines, as well all the data communications transmitted trough this last ones, stored on computers or processed by software, are consider cyber assets. Cyber assets are essential to the operation of critical assets infra-structures like generation plant, power lines, transformers or substations.
The power of a SCADA operator to control a wide electrical infrastructure just seating in front of a computer, has brought incredible cost/efficiency advantages for electrical utilities, however it also gave rise to an increasing importance and visibility of the cyber assets. Although Cyber Assets are essential to achieve our expectations for high continuity of electrical service, they also have jeopardised the service itself. They are attractive targets for malicious groups or individuals that intend to cause disruption of the service. These kinds of attacks to critical information infrastructures fall often into cyber-crime and cyber-terrorism and cause severe financial impact to electrical companies as also social implications in our lives.
Nowadays, with the increasing quality requirements of the electrical business regulator and the penalties for power disruptions and, essentially, after the 11th September, it becomes clear, to the electrical utilities, the importance of the Cyber Assets, their impact on the business as well as the need to protect them.
Threats to Critical Cyber Assets
Usually, threat agent is the term used to describe the potential source of a threat. To identify possible threat sources we must have a holistic view of the entire system. We need to consider all the aspects of the security discipline, starting from computers, go through physical security and go further up to operation procedures, social engineering and other security aspects.
Threat Agents could be sorted out in two basic categories: Internal Threats and External Threats. Internal Threats could arise from Employees or Contractors that have a great access to confidential and critical information and also physical access to installations with critical cyber assets. These internal threats could be accidental or intentional; however they represent an important source of successful attacks to Cyber Assets. External threats agents don't have an authorized physical access to facilities or sensitive information. These kinds of threats could be, for instance, natural or man-made disasters, that obviously are hard to avoid or predict. Others, more important to this paper, are classified as targeted with special or no-special knowledge. One of the critical external threat agent, fallen in the targeted with special knowledge category is the former inside, that could be an ex-employee who quit and still has confidential information. Even if we forget information that comes from inside it is possible for the attacker to find out confidential information if we remember that SCADA vendors, for instance, will sell equivalent systems and training to anyone with cash.
Cyber Asset Protection
To face these threats we must provide protection to cyber assets. Protection must be considered at several levels, that includes: physical access to facilities; procedures for employee and contractors; procedures to handle with sensitive/confidential material; credentials and passwords; security patching and virus scanning; firewalls; intrusion detection; security incidents response and reporting; electrical power restoration for cyber assets; remote access; log retention and audit files and data communications encryption among others. Protection is crucial for cyber assets.
SECURITY AND DEPENDABILITY
Several recent works have recognized the insufficient resilience of critical information infrastructures (CII) such as power grids, against faults and intrusions. This risky situation can be amplified in the years to come, by new hazards caused by the proliferation of networked embedded gadgets and mobile devices with capacity of causing physical damage. Power distribution grids have deserved a great deal of attention out of fear of instability and/or cyber attacks, putting companies under pressure. As a matter of fact, society now looks at these critical services in a very demanding way and events that would go almost unperceived years ago, now deserve prime time in media, such as the recent US-Canada or the Italian blackouts, to name one example. The North American blackout is extremely relevant to the subject of this paper: as highlighted in the analysis report [3] , the failure of various information systems prevented the operators from confining the power failure before it cascaded out of control, leading to an escalating blackout, characteristic of interdependent critical infrastructures.
Researchers and industries are becoming progressively aware of the problem, having produced several relevant works, such as power control systems interdependency and cyber risk assessment analyses and models [4, 10] , studies of the actual security of control systems, or establishment of process control security requirements [7, 8, 9] . Research initiatives and activities related to the protection of critical infrastructures and security of information and SCADA in electric power systems were launched in the USA and Europe [1,2,5,6].
Progress has been made over the past few years in order to better characterize the process of security failure. Vulnerabilities are the primordial faults existing inside the components, essentially requirements, specification, design or configuration faults (e.g., coding faults allowing program stack overflow, files with root setuid in UNIX, naive passwords, unprotected TCP/IP ports). Attacks are interaction faults that maliciously attempt to activate one or more of those vulnerabilities (e.g., port scans, email viruses, malicious Java applets or ActiveX controls). The event of a successful attack activating vulnerability is called an intrusion. This further step towards failure is normally characterized by an erroneous state in the system which may take several forms (e.g., an unauthorized privileged account with telnet access, a system file with undue access permissions to the hacker). It is important to understand at this point that it is the match between an existing vulnerability and an attack which activates it, which cause an intrusion. In fact, a component without vulnerabilities cannot be intruded upon. Likewise for a system completely protected from attacks. Unfortunately, both cases are in practice impossible to achieve in real-life CIIs.
C I R E D C I R E D C I R E D C I R E D
It is increasingly believed that systems became so complex, dynamic and interdependent, that it is no longer possible to address these vulnerabilities and attacks with classical paradigms such as perimeter defense or manual reaction. This calls for bringing the security and dependability models of CIIs to more sophisticated and demanding standards, such as assuming, for example, that perpetrators may be inside as well as outside the infrastructure, or even come from the suppliers or contractors own networks.
Likewise, manual or ad-hoc approaches on classic technologies will continue to be of crucial, but not sufficient, effectiveness. Different paradigms are required, in order to provide resilience in an automatic way, through appropriate architectures that combine dependability and security, such as fault and intrusion tolerance, which aim at keeping systems working correctly despite the occurrence of accidental faults, defects or bugs, attacks or intrusions. This way, automatic security of infrastructures, communications and electronic transactions can be achieved [2] .
IMPLEMENTED SECURITY SYSTEM AT EDP
SCADA systems evolved from hardware and software in the 1970s to current systems that include standard PCs and operating systems, TCP/IP communications, and Internet access. This evolution brings the possibility to integrate with business systems promoting external connections and information sharing. Even considering SCADA systems less vulnerable as the traditional Information Technology (IT) systems, because it was built based on a specific and proprietary software only known by a few people (security through obscurity), the connections between these two systems promote a growing concern about security.
Aware of this problem, in 2001 EDP designed and implemented a security architecture in order to protect the SCADA system. Therefore, using a common strategy for addressing security, a single security perimeter was established including in it all vulnerable critical cyber assets. All external access to the SCADA system has been protected by a strong access control scheme. In fact, all connections from outside, establish either from other corporate networks or from internet, were made based on strong authentication procedures and encrypted protocols, and accesses filtered by firewalls.
At this moment EDP, as well as the SCADA community, are recognizing the importance of protecting their systems and stopped believing that they are invulnerable or, at least, realized that hackers might be interested in their applications, probably know more than expected about their SCADA systems, and may be willing to invest enough to attack, including getting some form of internal access. The security perimeter strategy, in spite of ensuring a good level of security from outside, provides little or no security against someone inside the physical perimeter. The vulnerabilities and threats inside the security perimeter need to be addressed in order to improve security for SCADA control systems. An attack from inside represents a greater threat because it might be performed by someone who has got deeper knowledge of the system architecture and, on the other hand, has the cover of being already inside the security firewall perimeter.
EDP is now addressing these problems, through a project that aims at identifying current risks under a holistic attack model (inside as well as outside) and develop new schemes and techniques to bring its systems to the next (and higher) level of security and dependability.
FUTURE (SMARTGRIDS)
Efficient transmission and distribution of electricity is a fundamental requirement for providing societies and economies with essential energy resources. The common vision that electrical companies are moving toward should meet the needs of the future energy objectives for sustainability, security and competitiveness. Electrical grids are currently enduring a new and fundamental evolution, materialized in the vision of the Smartgrids concept. Smartgrids should be flexible and accessible granting connection access to all network users, particularly for renewable power sources and high efficiency local generation with zero or low carbon emission.
System Architecture
The active networks of the future will efficiently link small and medium scale power sources enabling efficient decisions on how to best operate the network. The level of control required to achieve such operation is far higher than found in the present transmission and distribution systems. The number of intelligent remote terminal units will spread over the entire infrastructure giving more possibilities for malicious individuals or groups to have success on their cyber attacks. The picture above ( fig. 1 ) illustrates all the actors of the new architecture planned for Smartgrids at EDP, in the scope of its INOVGRID Programme.
We can observe that all potential customers will have an Energy Box (EB) at their homes with a set of functionalities that goes from advanced metering to SCADA events communication or customer information display. The level immediately above will aggregate a set of EBs and will concentrate all the information from them. This aggregator component (identified by DTC -Distribution Transformer Controller) will also communicate in a bi-directional way with metering and SCADA systems. All these data communication relies on PLC and GPRS. At DTC level we still continue to have the entire actual SCADA infrastructure that naturally integrates this architecture. As explained before this adds a huge number of new sensors, remote systems and data communications.
Implementation Needs
All these new visions of electricity grids give rise to a new reality: the urgency to provide Smartgrids with security and dependability mechanisms to protect electrical utilities from cyber-attacks and accidents. With this challenge in mind, a working group started at EDP, whose mission is to create a set of security specifications and design requirements to adopt for the Smartgrids implementations.
The mission that should be accomplished is not an easy one if we take in consideration all that was said about the wide range of systems and data communications. This group is establishing general security practices that should guide any development of a new architecture component (Hardware components; Software or communications protocols). Questions like physical security perimeter on the new components (EBs and DTCs); data protection (information related to the customer and organization); equipments operation and maintenance procedures; equipments and information destruction or reuse; identity access to the systems; actions logs or data communications encryption are problems that EDP will address on this new modern electricity networks trying hard to, at least, make the life of a cyber-attacker a bit harder.
CONCLUSIONS
The increased number of attacks on computer systems and computer networks has resulted in an increased concern of security issues in all critical infrastructures.
Usually attackers are looking to compromise the SCADA network security properties such as integrity, confidentiality, authentications and availability.
In order to strengthen SCADA networks there are, at least, three challenges needed to be achieved.
Firstly, it is important to define a security perimeter and improve the access control to the SCADA networks, making it more difficult for an attacker to get inside.
The second challenge consists on improving security inside the SCADA network and develop efficient security monitoring tools. Using these tools means that even if an attacker gets in it will be difficult to carry out an attack.
The third challenge is changing the way of thinking of vendors in order to identify limitations of existing products and technology implement adequate security measures on their products.
EDP has been concerned about all these issues and, had already built and tested a security perimeter, is now implementing security measures based on outputs from a security auditory developed to achieve this purpose.
Finally, to carry on the third challenge, EDP is starting to talking to vendors about this subject and things are going well at the moment.
